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CRIMINAL LAW-THE NEW DISCOVERY RULES
TERENCE F. MacCARTHY*
URING THE past year, the Illinois Supreme Court made a
most significant contribution to the everyday practice of
criminal law by liberalizing Illinois' Rules for Discovery and
Procedure for Trial in Criminal Cases.'
By way of background and to better enable one to fully appreciate
the significance of the new Illinois Discovery Rules, it should be ob-
served that unlike our brethren at the bar who practice in civil
courts, the criminal practitioner has not benefited from the use of
pretrial discovery procedures. Unfortunately, the criminal practi-
tioner has been denied the use of discovery due to incomplete in-
corporation of the English common law.
In 1792, an officer of the East India Company, charged with a
delinquency in his account, sought an order from the English court
directing the prosecutor to divulge a board of inquiry report which
had been prepared in India, the place of the alleged crime. Lord Chief
Justice Kenyon not only denied the discovery request, concluding
that courts were powerless to order the prosecutor to disclose mat-
ters contained in his file, but also confessed to being appalled that
such a request was even made.2 The Lord Chief Justice was moved
to suggest that granting discovery in criminal cases would "sub-
vert the whole system of criminal law."'3  Forty years later, Eng-
lish courts rejected the holding of Lord Chief Justice Kenyon in
Rex v. Holland.4 As a result, the English defendant is entitled to
* B.A., St. Joseph's College; J.D., DePaul University College of Law; Execu-
tive Director, Federal Defender Program (Chicago). The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Edward Albert and Richard Moriarty, members of the junior
staff of the DePaul Law Review.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, §§ 411-15 (1971).
2. Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792).
3. Id. at 1249.
4. See Rex v. Harrie, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1833).
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total discovery of a prosecutor's case through the vehicle of an ex-
tensive preliminary hearing.
Regrettably, the courts in our country, with the notable exception
of an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall sitting as circuit
judge in United States v. Burr,5 have totally relied upon and cited
as precedent the 1792 decision of Rex v. Holland. The result has
been most obvious: discovery has not existed as a meaningful ad-
junct of the criminal practice.
In this regard it is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Brennan, a
long-time advocate for the liberalization of discovery in criminal
cases, depicted the unfairness of our discovery procedures as com-
pared with those used in the Soviet Union and France:
I think it is particularly ironic that, according to Mr. Justice Jackson, Soviet prose-
cutors at the War Crimes Trials at Nurenberg vigorously protested against adoption
of the prevailing American procedures on the ground that they are just 'not fair to
the defendants.' The upshot was a compromise procedure which permitted the ac-
cused at those trials more liberal discovery than allowed under American law, al-
though apparently narrower than Soviet or French practice sanctions.6
In May of 1969, under the chairmanship of circuit court Judge
Warren E. Burger, the American Bar Association's Project on Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice released its Tentative Draft of Standards
5. 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). The language of Chief Justice
Marshall hardly compares with the opinions of other courts in their traditional de-
nials of discovery requests. Addressing himself to the defendant's requests for
"copies of certain orders, understood to have been issued to the land and naval
officers of the United States for the apprehension of the accused, and an original
letter from General Wilkinson to the president in relation to the accused . .. "
Chief Justice Marshall made the following general observations: "So far back as any
knowledge of our jurisprudence is possessed, the uniform practice of this country
has been, to permit any individual, who was charged with any crime, to prepare
for his defense, and to obtain the process of the court, for the purpose of enabling
him so to do . . . and, wherever the right exists, it would be reasonable that it
should be accompanied with the means of rendering it effectual."
"It is a principle, universally acknowledged, that a party has a right to oppose to
the testimony of any witness against him, the declarations which that witness has
made at other times on the same subject. If he possesses this right, he must bring
forward proof of those declarations. This proof must be obtained before he knows
positively what the witness will say; for if he waits until the witness has been
heard at the trial, it is too late to meet him with his former declarations. Those
former declarations, therefore, constitute a mass of testimony, which a party has
a right to obtain by way of precaution, and the positive necessity of which can only
be decided at the trial." [d. at 36].
6. 33 F.R.D. 47, 59 (1963). (Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, Symposium
at the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 1963).
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Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial. 7  In August of
1970, subject to and accompanied by certain subsequently proposed
minor amendments, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association approved the new Discovery Standards and urged a com-
plete reevaluation of the present procedures. More specifically, the
Discovery Standards favor the value of and need for liberalized, com-
prehensive discovery procedures.' The very first sentence of the in-
troduction to the Discovery Standards notes that "[t]his report pro-
poses more permissive discovery practices for criminal cases than is
provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction in the United States."'
The introduction further suggests that "[t]he need for changes in pro-
cedures appeared manifest in order to lend more finality to criminal
dispositions, to speed up and simplify the process, and to make more
economical use of resources."'"
In drafting and adopting the new Illinois Discovery Rules, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court responded to the far-reaching recommendations
proposed by the ABA. In October of 1970, the court appointed
ten distinguished members of the court's bar to serve on the Committee
on Criminal Discovery. That committee, chaired by Professor
Charles H. Bowman, included judges, prosecutors and defense attor-
neys.'1 The court directed the committee to prepare and submit
recommendations for a comprehensive plan for improving the lib-
eralized discovery suggested by the ABA Standards Committee.
The efforts of the committee resulted in the court's adoption of the
Supreme Court Rules for Discovery and Procedure Before Trial in
Criminal Cases on October 1, 1971. The court and its distinguished
7. American Bar Association on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial
(1969) [Hereinafter referred to as Discovery Standards].
8. American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Ap-
proved Draft of Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (1970).
See also the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice in a similar but for the most part unheeded conclusion in its report entitled,
"The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" (1967). The commission expressed
itself in favor of "the expansion of pretrial discovery . in criminal cases. id.
at 138-39.
9. Discovery Standards at 1.
10. id. at 2.
11. Besides Professor Bowman, the members of that committee were: Roy 0.
Gulley, Administrative Director of the Illinois Courts; Jack E. Brunnenmeyer;
Elmer C. Kissane; George Cotsirilos; Allen Lev; Judge Edward J. Egan; Judge
Wayne C. Townley Jr.; William V. Hopf; James B. Zagel; and William T. Kirby.
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committee are to be complimented for a job well done. As a result
of their efforts, Illinois has one of the most comprehensive, farsighted
and practical set of discovery rules of any state.
The purpose of this article, however, is not to laud the rules, but
to offer practical comments directed to the practitioner's contem-
plated use of the rules. 2 Accordingly, considering the rules in seri-
atim fashion, the following comments and suggestions relative to
their use and possible misuse are offered.
RULE 411-APPLICABILITY
These rules shall be applied in all criminal cases wherein the accused is charged
with an offense for which, upon conviction, he might be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary. They shall become applicable following indictment or information and shall
not be operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.
The new discovery rules do not apply to misdemeanors unless they
are initiated by indictment or information.' 3  Thus, in representing
persons accused of misdemeanors not initiated by indictment or in-
formation, defense counsel must resort to the discovery procedures
available prior to the adoption of the new rules.' 4
Although the new rules now apply to all felony and certain mis-
demeanor cases, defense counsel is not precluded from using prior
discovery procedures where, as might often be the case, prior pro-
cedures would permit more liberal discovery than otherwise provided
for in the new rules.
RULE 412--DISCLOSURE TO ACCUSED
(a) Except as is otherwise provided in these rules as to matters not subject to
disclosure and protective orders, the State shall, upon written motion of defense
12. See also Zagel and Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557 (1971).
13. See People v. Garfinkle, 169 111. App. 554 (1912) (misdemeanors can be
brought by indictment).
14. Prior to the adoption of the new rules, discovery was provided for in order
to: 1) obtain a bill of particulars, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-2 (1971);
2) obtain a list of witnesses and their addresses, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§
114-9 (1971); 3) obtain a copy of the confession of the defendants and witnesses
to the confession, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-10 (1971); 4) obtain, subject
to availability and the court's discretion, grand jury testimony, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 112-6 (1971); 5) obtain certain evidence in the state's possession.
See People v. Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 89, 230 N.E.2d 161, 165 (1967); People v.
Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
[Vol. XXII:223226
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counsel, disclose to defense counsel the following material and information within its
possession or control:
(i) the names and last known addresses of persons whom the State intends
to call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded
statements, memoranda containing substantially verbatim reports of their
oral statements, and a list of memoranda reporting or summarizing their
oral statements. Upon written motion of defense counsel memoranda
reporting or summarizing oral statements shall be examined by the court
in camera and if found to be substantially verbatim reports of oral
statements shall be disclosed to defense counsel.
In considering Illinois' disclosure to the accused under this rule, it
should be contrasted with the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Under the federal rule, the defendant
is not permitted discovery of statements made by a government witness
until the witness "has testified on direct examination ... ."', The
Illinois rule is considerably more liberal by allowing discovery of
names, addresses and relevant written or recorded statements of pro-
secution witnesses without conditioning it on the direct examination of
the witnesses at trial.
The Illinois rules, however, do not allow discovery of the state-
ments of witnesses not to be called by the prosecutor. In Illinois,
this result might be achieved through a motion under Rule
412(h). 16 Having discussed these substantive limitations of Rule
412(a) (i), it is essential to point out the limitations arising from
the form that discovery must take under this rule.
By requiring the filing of written motions, the court missed an
excellent opportunity to be innovative. The framers of the rules
could have eliminated the need for the filing of written motions and
provided, instead, that discovery must, upon defendant's request, be
automatically granted when dealing with matters thereinafter enu-
merated. Had such a self-operating procedure been adopted, it
would have: 1) disentangled the defense attorney from what would
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). One reason behind this provision is the protection
of government witnesses from possible intimidation by the defense. Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16(b) does not allow disclosure "of statements made by
government witnesses . . ." except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500. As to this rea-
soning, compare MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 16.02 with Flannery, The Prosecu-
tor's Case Against Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74, 79 (1963) and Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. L.Q. 279,
285-88.
16. See infra for discussion of Rule 412(b).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
soon become, to a large degree, mere ministerial work, 2) alleviated
the need for the prosecutor to respond to written motions and, most
importantly, 3) diminished the necessity of judges ruling on dis-
covery motions, which augments the overcrowded dockets of the
trial courts.
As the rule stands now, the practitioner's attention is called to the
necessity of filing written motions. A criminal lawyer who, under
the present rules, fails to specifically request all of the matters pro-
vided for in the rules would be subject to criticism and the accusation
of incompetence. 7
The practitioner must be aware of the limitation of the term
"statements," which is, in effect, defined as being limited to "sub-
stantially verbatim reports." This definition, therefore, excludes
"summarizations" of a witness' comments. The court's reasoning is
understandable. One of the main purposes in obtaining a witness'
statements is to permit impeachment of the witness at trial. How-
ever, impeachment is understandably and necessarily limited to state-
ments of the witness himself and not summarizations of those state-
ments by another since the latter are likely to be subjective.
It should be noted, however, that this subsection of the rule still
allows for a request to be made of the prosecutor that he specifically
identify, even though he need not surrender, summarizations of wit-
ness' statements. Where such a request is favorably responded to
and the prosecutor does submit a list of summarizations, it remains
for the defense attorney to move that the alleged summarizations be
submitted to and examined by the court in camera.
RULE 412(a) (ii)
(ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral
statements made by the accused or by a codefendant, and a list of wit-
nesses to the making and acknowledgment of such statements.
While the defendant is entitled to his own statements and those of
his codefendants, no mention is made or distinction drawn between
"substantially verbatim reports" and mere summarizations. Quite
17. Parenthetically, in making discovery requests pursuant to a specific rule of
statutory authorization requests should be made in the exact language used in the
specific rule or statutory authorization.
[Vol. XXII:223
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possibly no such distinction was intended since the language of the
rule, in addition to using the term "statements," also refers to the
"substance of" any statements. By using the terms "substance of'
the court may have intended to automatically entitle a defendant not
only to his statements but also to summarizations as well.
Whatever the intent of the court, it would seem prudent for de-
fense attorneys, in making a discovery request pursuant to the above
subsection, to request "any written or recorded statements. . ." and
summarizations thereof made by the accused or by a codefendant. To
the extent that such a request pertains to summarizations of a defend-
ant's statements, it cannot be reasonably opposed when we recall and
appreciate the reason for the "summarization" exception in the pre-
ceding subsection. Certainly, a defendant's right to his own state-
ments is in no way conditioned or dependent upon their value in
permitting him to impeach himself.
It is also important to note that when making requests and seek-
ing compliance under this subsection, defense attorneys should not
overlook their right, by reason of 412(a)(ii), to obtain surrepti-
tiously recorded or monitored conversations of the defendant. All
too often requests for this type of statement are predicated solely
upon constitutionally protected rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Requests made under the authority of this subsection
are much easier to support.
RULE 412(a) (iii)
(iii) a transcript of those portions of grand jury minutes containing testimony
of the accused and relevant testimony of persons whom the prosecuting
attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.
Similar to Rule 16(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, this rule entitles the defendant to his grand jury testimony.
In practice, the value of this subsection to the defense counsel is the
most illusory of all the discovery provisions, since rarely, if ever, is
a putative defendant called before a grand jury. The calling of a
putative defendant before a grand jury might indeed raise serious
ethical questions.18
18. See American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Approved Draft of Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function, § 3.6(d)(e) (1971).
1972] 229
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The Illinois rule, however, goes much further than Federal Rule
16(a)(2) by entitling the defendant to the "relevant" grand jury
testimony of persons intended to be called as witnesses by the prose-
cutor. This portion of the rule is commendably consistent with the
recent trend in liberalizing the use of grand jury testimony where the
release of such testimony is warranted or required by more signifi-
cant considerations (such as the defendant's right to prepare and
present an adequate defense).19 Excepting the more liberalized
criteria upon which courts have directed the production of grand jury
testimony of witnesses (to impeach the witness, to test the witness'
credibility or to refresh the witness' memory), there is no longer se-
rious question that a defendant is entitled to the testimony of adverse
witnesses who appear before the grand jury. Surprisingly, most
prosecutors still successfully resist requests for pretrial disclosure of
witness' grand jury "testimony" treating such material as "state-
ments" of those witnesses.20 The new rule automatically entitles
the defendant to grand jury testimony without the necessity of deter-
mining the existence or nonexistence of the "particularized need"
criteria and, more importantly, entitles the defendant to this material
as part of pretrial discovery.
It must be pointed out, however, that this portion of rule 412(a)
(iii) may also be somewhat ineffectual in practice. The rule does
not require prosecutors to stenographically record the testimony of
grand jury witnesses. It might well be anticipated that, to avoid
the tactical disadvantages which might be occasioned by compliance
with this rule, prosecutors, where there is any possibility that the wit-
ness' testimony might harm their case, will not have it recorded. 2
19. In Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 886 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court, depending upon how you read and interpret the decision, either
eliminated the "particularized need" test of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) decision, or at the very least, suggested a more
expansive interpretation of these terms "where the ends of justice require it." 384
U.S. at 869-70.
20. In the federal court, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and, in Illinois, prior to adoption of
the new discovery rules, People v. Neiman, 30 Ill. App. 2d 393, 397, 197 N.E.2d 8,
10 (1964); People v. Wolff, 19 I11. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960) limited the
right to review witness' statements until after the witness had testified on direct
examination.
21. The only jurisdiction which now requires the stenographic recording of the
testimony of all the grand jury witnesses is the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Local Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 1.04(c)).
230 [Vol. XXII:223
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RULE 412(a) (iv)
(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particu-
lar case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of sci-
entific tests, experiments, or comparisons.
This subsection of the rule, in effect, adopts Rule 16(a) (2) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.22 Since the Illinois Rule is
comparable to the Federal Rule, the Illinois practitioner would be
well advised to use relevant Federal Rules decisions in arguing by
analogy. 23
RULE 412 (a) (v)
(v) any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible objects which the
prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were
obtained from or belong to the accused.
In entitling the defendant to anything obtained from or belonging
to the accused, this subsection is more limited in one respect than
the applicable federal rule. Federal Rule 16(b) allows discovery
of any books, papers, documents, tangible objects or places within
the possession, custody or control of the government, whether ob-
tained from or belonging to the accused or not.
One should note that the broadest and most significant part of
the rule is that which gives a defendant the right to discover any-
thing the prosecutor intends to use at trial. This rule, then, neces-
sarily contemplates pretrial discovery of all items of tangible evi-
dence which the prosecutor might offer into evidence at the trial.
22. FED. R. CrM. P. 16(a)(2).
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) states that "the court may order . . ." [emphasis
added]. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 253 which states that
the material enumerated in 16(a) will almost always be granted as a matter of
right. A contrary result was reached in United States v. Isa, 413 F.2d 244 (7th
Cir. 1969) where the court held that though "the court may order . . ." seman-
tically implies discretion, a trial court must order production pursuant to a Rule
16(a) request unless the government interposes a subsection (e) claim requesting a
protective order.
The drafters of the 1970 proposed amendments, acknowledged the conflict in cir-
cuits occasioned by the use of the term "may", and suggest this conflict be resolved
consistent with the holding of the previously cited Seventh Circuit decision. Their
amendment substitutes the word "shall" for the present word "may". 48 F.R.D.
547, 589 (1970). It should be noted that this discussion is not limited to this sub-
section but to all those under Illinois Rule 412(a) and Federal Rule 16(a) and (b).
1972]
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RULE 412 (a) (vi)
(vi) any record of prior criminal convictions, which may be used for im-
peachment, of persons whom the State intends to call as witnesses at the
hearing or trial.
In providing for discovery of intended witnesses' "rap sheets," the
rule avoids issues which might arise from the Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in Brady v. Maryland.2 4  In that case, the Supreme
Court held that non-disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused
25
violated due process regardless of whether the evidence was material
to guilt or punishment.
Although no court has expressly applied the Brady test to wit-
nesses' prior criminal records, Judge William J. Campbell in United
States v. Leichtfuss, 26 noted, in dicta, that such evidence "may well be
evidence . .. favorable to an accused . . . within the meaning
of Brady.
The practitioner should note that the rule is limited in scope to
those records "which may be used for impeachment. . . ." Since
this rule is to be used for impeachment purposes, it is necessarily
limited to those witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call and to
infamous crimes.2 However, it applies to intended trial witnesses and
to intended preliminary hearing witnesses. The addition of the pre-
liminary hearing witnesses may be due to the increasing judicial
recognition that what occurs at the hearing may be just as vital or
damaging to the defendant's case as what occurs at the trial.
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) [Hereinafter cited as Brady].
25. Id. at 87.
26. 331 F. Supp. 723 (1971). A recent case, United States v. Gibson, - F.
Supp. -, (D.C. 1972), 12 Cr. L. 2096, however, has held that prior convictions of
prospective government witnesses is "exculpatory matter" under Brady and must be
turned over.
27. Id. at 736. See also, Giles v. State of Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
(A rape case in which one of the facts suppressed by the prosecutor which the
Court said was favorable to the accused was that a caseworker had recommended
probation for the girl because she was beyond parental control.) But see, Hemphill
v. United States, 392 F.2d 45 (1968), as to denials of defendant's request for pre-
trial discovery of witnesses' prior criminal records as not being an abuse of discretion.
28. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 1 (1971); which provides that
prior convictions of infamous crimes may be used to attack the credibility of a wit-
ness. See also Werdell v. Turznski, 128 Il. App. 2d 139, 153-54, 262 N.E.2d 833
[Vol. XXII:223232
CRIMINAL LAW
RULE 412 (b)
(b) The State shall inform defense counsel if there has been any electronic sur-
veillance (including wiretapping) of conversations to which the accused was a
party, or of his premises.
In light of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street
Act of 196829 and our apparent tendency toward an Orwellian so-
ciety, the importance of determining the existence and obtaining
judicial review of electronic surveillance is significant. Moreover,
as the incidents of conversation monitoring become more pervasive,
the courts have taken it upon themselves to greatly expand the scope
of the fourth amendment protection as it pertains to conversation. 0
In adopting the rule in its present form, the court is apparently
paying heed to the United States Supreme Court opinion in Alder-
man v. United States."' However, the wording of the rule may create
additional problems and may be misleading to the practitioner whose
client has been under surveillance. In this regard, the following spe-
cific comments to the rule's application are offered.
By limiting the rule's scope to "electronic surveillance," the rule
apparently excludes surreptitiously overheard conversations where
no electronic device was used.32 In Katz v. U.S.,33 although an
electronic eavesdropping case, the Court based its decision not upon
this fact, nor upon the prior distinction of whether the wiretapping
occurred in a constitutionally protected area, but upon the fact that
the conversation was intended to be private.34  The fact that no
electronic device is used to listen to or intrude upon a conversation
would, therefore, not limit the scope of constitutional protection.
(1970). "[A]n infamous crime is an offense implying such a dereliction of morals
that it shows a total disregard of the obligation of an oath . . . [and] is inconsistent
with the principles of honesty and decency." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 587 (1971).
29. 18 U.S.C. 2510 et. seq.
30. See generally Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Supreme Court: A
Move Back?, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 86 (1972).
31. 394 U.S. 165 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as Alderman].
32. Although the exclusion here may be moot in terms of excluding from pretrial
discovery altogether any non-electronic surveillance (See infra as to how Rule
412(a)(ii) may be used to reach the product of such a surveillance), there is
no guarantee of 412(a) (ii)'s effectiveness in this area. Further, there are no viable
reasons for restricting 412(b) to electronic surveillance alone.
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. Id. at 351. The Court stated that "what [a personl seeks to preserve
19721
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Accordingly, unless and until this issue is further clarified by the
courts, defense counsel should request not only matters obtained by
electronic surveillance but also any results of conversation monitor-
ing in addition to the general request under 412(a)(ii) for state-
ments made by the defendant.
It is interesting to note that the committee comments, while citing
Alderman, suggest the possibility of "in camera hearings on the
question of suppression of such evidence. . . . "3 This appears
to be inconsistent with the holding in Alderman which states, "[wie
conclude that surveillance records as to which any petitioner has
any standing to object should be turned over to him without being
screened in camera by the trial judge." Prior to Alderman prose-
cutors would submit the results of conversation monitoring only to
the court. It was then for the court to determine the relevancy of
the material to the pending charges. It was this procedure which
Alderman attacked, concluding that only defendants and defense at-
torneys could possibly determine the potential relevancy of this ma-
terial. Appreciating this interpretation of Alderman, it is difficult
to understand the suggested use of in camera proceedings.
RULE 412 (c)
(c) Except as is otherwise provided in these rules as to protective orders, the State
shall disclose to defense counsel any material or information within its posses-
sion or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense
charged or would tend to reduce his punishment therefor.
This rule gives the defendant something less than they are consti-
tutionally entitled. However, it does compel the prosecutor to com-
ply with his obligation somewhat sooner than might otherwise be
necessary. In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court
said:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
3 6
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."
35. ILLINois RULE BOOK, Sup. CT. RULES, Comments of Rule 412 at 110j and
394 U.S. at 182.
36. 373 U.S. at 87, see also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7; Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66 (1967).
(Vol. XXII: 223
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The wording of Rule 412(c), in entitling a defendant to material
which "tends to negate the guilt . . or . . reduce his pun-
ishment . . ." merely restates the language of Brady's holding call-
ing attention to and enforcing compliance with the dictates of Brady.
Nevertheless, serious constitutional questions are raised by the
protective order exception in Rule 412(i) which qualifies the rule.
It, along with the work product, informer and national security ex-
ceptions, is common and fairly well-accepted in the formulation of
discovery rules.37 To the extent, however, that the material required
by Brady to be turned over to the defendant is subject to the protective
order exception, or any exception, the rule is constitutionally sus-
pect.38 Since the Brady holding was based on a due process analysis,
it is obvious that its mandate cannot be subjugated to what is, at best,
a policy exception to discovery. Both prosecutors and defense at-
torneys should be aware that noncompliance with the rule's re-
quirement based on the protective order exception is likely to cause
serious constitutional problems.
In one respect the rule, however, goes even further than the ap-
parent requirements of Brady, since nowhere in Brady does the
Court indicate that it would require the production of evidence
favorable to the accused prior to trial. The facts in Brady involved
a post-conviction hearing and thus the Court did not discuss ex-
tending its rule to pretrial discovery.
Parenthetically, the most recently released American Bar Associa-
tion Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function, Standard 3.11, in addition to encouraging full discovery,
condemn as "unprofessional" a prosecutor's failure ". . . to disclose
to defense at the earliest feasible opportunity evidence which would
tend to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the degree of
the offense or reduce the punishment."39
37. See generally Discovery Standards §§ 2.6, 4.4 and accompanying commen-
taries; Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 292 (1963); Comment, Use of Protective Orders as a
Safeguard in Broadening Criminal Discovery, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (1965).
38. Discovery Standards, § 2.1(c) is phrased in exactly the same manner as
the Illinois rule, which appears, for the most part, to have been fashioned from
these standards. This does not diminish, however, the constitutional difficulty one
may encounter with the rule.
39. See note 18 supra at § 3.11.
1972] 235
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RULE 412 (d)-(g)
(d) The State shall perform its obligations under this rule as soon as practicable
following the filing of a motion by defense counsel.
(e) The State may perform these obligations in any manner mutually agreeable to
itself and defense counsel or by:
(i) notifying defense counsel that material and information, described in
general terms, may be inspected, obtained, tested, copied, or photo-
graphed, during specified reasonable times; and
(ii) making available to defense counsel at the time specified such material
and information, and suitable facilities or other arrangements for in-
spection, testing, copying, and photographing of such material and in-
formation.
kf) The State should ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the
various investigative personnel and its office sufficient to place within its pos-
session or control all material and information relevant to the accused and the
offense charged.
(g) Upon defense counsel's request and designation of material or information
which would be discoverable if in the possession or control of the State and
which is in the possession or control of other governmental personnel, the State
shall use diligent good faith efforts to cause such material to be made available
to defense counsel; and if the State's efforts are unsuccessful and such material
or other governmental personnel are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the
court shall issue suitable subpoenas or orders to cause such material to be made
available to defense counsel.
These subsections deal with significant procedural amenities in
complying with the spirit and letter of the discovery rules. They
speak in general terms of the methods the state is to adopt in com-
plying with the requirements of the new rules, and further, of the
state's obligation to obtain material made discoverable by the rules.
These enabling provisions are clear, definite and fairly self-explana-
tory and thus detailed discussion of sections (d), (e), and (f) is not
required here.
RULE 412(h)
(h) Discretionary disclosure. Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of
the defense, and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may re-
quire disclosure to defense counsel of relevant material and information not
covered by this rule.
This is indeed a broad and yet possibly the most overlooked
section of the rules. It apparently adopts the materiality and rea-
sonableness requirements found in Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. It also incorporates the relevancy require-
ments found in Rule 16(a) of the federal rules. Rule 412(h) per-
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mits a defendant to make any additional discovery requests not
otherwise covered by the rules. Accordingly, this is the rule that
could and should be cited by the defense in support of any addi-
tional discovery requests made by a defendant.
RULE 412 (i)
(i) Denial of disclosure. The court may deny disclosure authorized by this rule
and Rule 413 if it finds that there is a substantial risk to any person of physical
harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or unnecessary annoyance or
embarrassment resulting from such disclosure which outweighs any usefulness
of the disclosure to counsel.
This subsection provides for a specific exception to otherwise au-
thorized discovery. Although the specific terms are not used, it
provides for what have commonly been referred to as "protective
orders."
Based upon experience with the analogous federal rule, Rule 16
(e), this exception, though proper, will not often be used. In any
event, the subsection does provide that, where appropriate, a prose-
cutor or defense attorney might seek the court's protection against
the necessity of complying with the rule's discovery requirements.
Although not specifically spelled out, it would appear that invocation
of the rule would require a written motion by the person requesting
protection. However, it is quite possible that such a motion might
properly be presented in camera.
This is one of the few protective order rules which specifically
itemizes the possible circumstances which might justify the court in
finding it necessary to invoke this exception. If this rule ever be-
comes widely used, substantial litigation might arise from the sub-
jectivity inherent in the terms "annoyance" and "embarrassment."
It should be re-emphasized that this rule cannot be used to avoid
compliance with the requirements of Brady.
RULE 412 (j)
(j) Matters not subject to disclosure.
(i) Work product. Disclosure under this rule and Rule 413 shall not be required
of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the
extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the State or
members of its legal or investigative staffs, or of defense counsel or his staff.
(ii) Informants. Disclosure of an informant's identity shall not be required
where his identity is a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not
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infringe the constitutional rights of the accused. Disclosure shall not be
denied hereunder of the identity of witnesses to be produced at a hearing or
trial.
(iii) National security. Disclosure shall not be required where it involves a
substantial risk of grave prejudice to national security and where a failure to
disclose will not infringe the constitutional rights of the accused. Disclosure
shall not thus be denied hereunder regarding witnesses or material to be
produced at a hearing or trial.
Here the rule sets forth the other three generally acknowledged
"exceptions" to discovery." ° Again, these exceptions cannot serve
to justify a failure to provide that which is consitutionally required
pursuant to the Brady decision.
The "work product" exception is as anomalous as it is apparently
well-accepted. Since, in civil practice, the "work product" exception
is not an absolute privilege, it must fall whenever a discovery claimant
can establish "good cause."41  Appreciating its dubious status as an
exception to civil discovery, constant and uniform reference to the
work product exception in criminal discovery is indeed surprising
and questionable.
The "identity of informants" exception cautions against the indis-
criminate and unnecessary requirement that a prosecutor identify
his informants. The language of the rule does an excellent job of
codifying and synthesizing the law applicable to disclosure of an in-
formant's identity.42
The last, and definitely the least, important of the exceptions is the
"national security" exception. In the context of normal state pros-
ecutions it is doubtful whether this rule will ever be employed.
RULE 413-DISCLOSURE TO PROSECUTION
(a) The person of the accused. Notwithstanding the initiation of judicial proceed-
ings, and subject to constitutional limitations, a judicial officer may require
the accused, among other things, to:
(i) appear in a line up;
(ii) speak for identification by witnesses to an offense;
40. See generally American Bar Association Project on Standards of Criminal
Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, § 2.6.
41. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see also Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 34.
42. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (A state court is under no
absolute duty to require disclosure of an informer's identification at a pretrial
hearing held to determine the existence of probable cause where there was ample
proof of the informer's reliability).
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(iii) be fingerprinted;
(iv) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of a scene;
(v) try on articles of clothing;
(vi) permit the taking of specimens of material under his fingernails;
(vii) permit the taking of samples of his blood, hair and other material of his
body which involve no unreasonable intrusion thereof;
(viii) provide a sample of his handwriting; and
(ix) submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body.
(b) Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing
purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be
given by the State to the accused and his counsel, who shall have the right to be
present. Provision may be made for appearances for such purposes in an order
admitting the accused to bail or providing for his release.
Consistent with the current trend, Rule 413 provides for recipro-
cal discovery, or discovery by the prosecutor from the defendant.4 3
Unlike Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
above rule is not conditioned upon prior defense requests for dis-
covery.
In what may well prove to be obvious understatement, the rule
specifically indicated it is "subject to constitutional limitations.
." It goes on to specifically itemize areas which are clearly en-
tangled with evolving constitutional problems-in particular, issues
created more by the fourth than the fifth amendment." The diffi-
culty with these issues specifically arises when one seeks to require
a defendant to speak for identification, be fingerprinted, permit the
taking of blood samples, hair or other materials of his body or pro-
vide handwriting examplars."5
A leading case in this area is Davis v. Mississippi,4 where fin-
gerprints were obtained incident to an arrest without probable cause.
There, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that "[d]etentions for the sole
purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the con-
straints of the fourth amendment. ' 47  In light of Davis, it is now be-
43. But see Doherty, Total Pretrial Disclosure to the State, 60 ILL. B.J. 534
(1972) and Note, Prosecutorial Discovery under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 994 (1972).
44. See generally, Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prose-
cution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972).
45. See United States v. Dionisio, 41 L.W. 4180 (January 22, 1973) and com-
panion cases; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood samples).
46. 394 U.S. 721 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
47. Id. at 727.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
ing argued that the discovery of fingerprints and sinilar personal
items are subject to the fourth amendment's proscription against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. (This protection in light of Dionisio
et al extends to the "seizure" of the person but not to the taking of
handwriting examplars or fingerprints.) Although the rule does not
necessarily suffer constitutional infirmities, its application certainly
warrants caution.
If, for example, an attorney represented a defendant from whom
the state, pursuant to Rule 413, requested fingerprints, that attorney
would be placed in the position of being required to fully interpret
the implications of Davis. Assuming the prosecuting attorney sup-
ported his fingerprint request with a showing of "probable cause",
one issue would be resolved. In this regard, it is appropriate to re-
call that the fourth amendment does not proscribe all searches, only
unreasonable ones.48 If, on the other hand, the prosecutor merely
relied on the rule in making his request and does not attach to his
request affidavits supporting probable cause, a defense attorney
might well consider an initial refusal to produce. Assuming that
this refusal may be met by a court order requiring production, com-
pliance by the defendant would then preserve any constitutional is-
sue created by the absence of a showing of probable cause.
Another issue is raised when the court, based upon "probable
cause," enters its order upon the defendant to submit to the re-
quired fingerprint tests. It is sufficient to note here that the court
order, as a search warrant, must be narrowly drawn and specific.
Notwithstanding strong arguments to the contrary, this author is
not opposed to reciprocal discovery provisions. In opting for
broader discovery, it has been my purpose to rally against the present
practice of trying criminal cases in a secretive or stealthy manner.
By urging the wisdom of taking criminal law out of the dark ages
through broad discovery, I am unable to now argue against a prose-
cutor's right to similar discovery (so long as that right does not in-
fringe upon a defendant's right against self-incrimination).
RULE 413 (c)
(c) Medical and scientific reports. Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial
court shall, on written motion, require that the State be informed of, and per-
48. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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mitted to inspect and copy or photograph, any reports or results, or testimony
relative thereto, of physical or mental examinations or of scientific tests, ex-
periments or comparisons, or any other reports or statements of experts which
defense counsel has in his possession or control, except that those portions of
reports containing statements made by the defendant may be withheld if de-
fense counsel does not intend to use any of the material contained in the report
at a hearing or trial.
This rule provides for reciprocal discovery of medical and scien-
tific reports. It should be noted that this disclosure to the prosecu-
tion is based on and limited to the sixth amendment right to cross-
examination of witnesses at "a hearing or trial." The analogous
rule which applies to the defense, Rule 412(a)(iv), is somewhat
broader in that it pertains to any medical or scientific reports "made
in connection with the particular case. . . ." Such a distinc-
tion takes into account the necessary preservation of the defendant's
right against self-incrimination.
RULE 413 (d)-(e)
(d) Defenses. Subject to constitutional limitations and within a reasonable time
after the filing of a written motion by the State, defense counsel shall inform
the State of any defenses which he intends to make at a hearing or trial and
shall furnish the State with the following material and information within his
possession or control:
(i) The names and last known addresses of persons he intends to call as wit-
nesses together with their relevant written or recorded statements, includ-
ing memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements, any record
of prior criminal convictions known to him; and
(ii) any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects he intends
to use as evidence or for impeachment at a hearing or trial.
(e) Additional disclosure. Upon a showing of materiality, and if the request is
reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to the State of rele-
vant material and information not covered by this rule.
This subsection, which requires a defendant to inform the state
of any possible defenses he intends to set forth, is quite broad and
probably will result in much litigation. Strong support for this sub-
section, at least as it applies to a possible alibi defense, can be found
in the United States Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Flor-
ida.49 In this case, the Court considered and rejected a constitu-
tional attack upon the Florida statute which required a defendant
to serve a notice of his alibi upon the prosecution.
49. 399 U.S. 78 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
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On the practical side, it might well be expected that many de-
fense attorneys, in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the rule,
may reply to a request for a listing of defenses by simply stating "the
defendant didn't do it," or by possibly stating, in seriatim fashion,
every defense imaginable in all criminal cases.
RULE 414-EVIDENCE DEPOSITIONS
(a) If it appears to the court in which a criminal charge is pending that the deposi-
tion of any person other than the defendant is necessary for the preservation of
relevant testimony because of the substantial possibility it would be unavailable
at the time of hearing or trial, the court may, upon motion and notice to both
parties and their counsel, order the taking of such person's deposition under oral
examination or written questions for use as evidence at a hearing or trial.
(b) The taking of depositions shall be in accordance with rules providing for the
taking of depositions in civil cases, and the order for the taking of a deposition
may provide that any designated book, papers, documents or tangible objects,
not privileged, be produced at the same time and place.
(c) If a witness is committed for failure to execute a recognizance to appear to
testify at a hearing or trial, the court on written motion of the witness and
upon notice to the State and defense counsel may order that his deposition be
taken, and after the deposition has been subscribed, the court may discharge the
witness.
(d) Rule 207--Signing and Filing Depositions-shall apply to the signing and filing
of depositions taken pursuant to this rule.
(e) The defendant and defense counsel shall have the right to confront and cross-
examine any witness whose deposition is taken. The defendant and defense
counsel may waive such right in writing, filed with the clerk of the court.
(f) If the defendant is indigent, all costs of taking depositions shall be paid by the
county wherein the criminal charge is initiated. If the defendant is not indigent
the costs shall be allocated as in civil cases.
Frequently criminal rules which provide for the taking of deposi-
tions appear merely in semantic form and are not a part of the actual
practice of criminal law. The above rule easily supports this point.
The rule requires a motion which must indicate both that the taking
of the deposition is necessary for the preservation of relevant testi-
mony and that there is a substantial possibility that the witness will
be unavailable to testify. It is most peculiar when a prosecutor or
defense attorney knows in advance that both of these requirements
will be present. In sum, the appearance of this rule will have little,
if any, effect on the practice of criminal law.50
50. See generally Zagel and Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois
Rules, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557, 588-90.
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RULE 415-REGULATIONS OF DISCOVERY
(a) Investigations not to be impeded. Except as is otherwise provided as to mat-
ters not subject to disclosure and protective orders, neither the counsel for the
parties for other prosecution or defense personnel shall advise persons having
relevant material or information (except the accused) to refrain from discuss-
ing the case with opposing counsel or showing opposing counsel any relevant
material, nor shall they otherwise impede opposing counsel's investigation of
the case.
Rule 415(a), in effect, proscribes violations of the Canons of
Ethics."1 It is quite interesting to note that this is probably the only
instance where a court has, by rule, called specific attention to this
proscription against an attorney instructing his witnesses not to dis-
cuss the case with his adversary.
In reading the rule one should be reminded that the rule can-
not, and indeed does not, in any way curtail a witness' right to re-
fuse to discuss the facts of the case with either or both attorneys.
The rule merely serves to preclude attorneys from advising witnesses
to exercise this right. Nevertheless, an interesting question re-
mains: would an attorney's advice to a witness of his right to refuse
to discuss the facts of the case with opposing counsel be deemed a
violation of the duty imposed by the "otherwise impede" language
of this rule?
CONCLUSION
In attempting to bring criminal discovery up to the par of its civil
counterpart, the Illinois Rules represent a sure and affirmative step.
Though there still remain unresolved some substantive and pro-
cedural issues, such may be the result of the dangers inherent in
being a pioneer. Only when the Ilinois discovery rules are put to
the test in practice will all the problem areas surface.
51. American Bar Association, Canon of Professional and ludicial Ethics;
Canon 15 (1967).
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